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FIFTH AMENDMENT-HARMLESS
ERROR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO
COERCED CONFESSIONS
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Arizona v. Fulminante,1 the Supreme Court for the first time
applied the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California2 to a
case where a confession had allegedly been coerced, and therefore
erroneously admitted into evidence at trial. The three issues before
the court were: whether the confession was coerced and therefore
inadmissible; whether harmless error analysis could be applied to
the admission of the confession, if erroneous; and whether any error
was harmless in the present case.
Five Justices, in an opinion by Justice White, held as to the first
issue that the respondent had given his confession involuntarily, and
that the trial court had improperly admitted evidence of the confession at trial. Only one of those Justices, Justice Scalia, agreed with
Justice Rehnquist and the three remaining Justices on the second
issue. Those five Justices held that the error in question should be
subject to harmless error analysis. This position on the harmless
error analysis was criticized sharply by Justice White. On the third
issue, however, Justice White prevailed, leading four other Justices
in the holding that even if analyzed in terms of harmlessness, the
present error was not in fact harmless.
This Note will argue that the majority's decision with respect to
the voluntariness of Fulminante's confession was impermissibly expansive of the Court's prior holdings of involuntariness, when
viewed in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. However,
the majority's apparent expansion of the Chapman harmless error
holding to involuntary confessions may be justifiable even if one
does not agree with Justice Rehnquist's argument in its entirety.
Although the application of harmless error analysis to involuntary
confessions seems to present some .danger of completely eroding
I I11 S.

Ct. 1246 (1991).
2 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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the category of constitutional errors which always warrant a new
trial, prudent use of this analysis by the courts will likely result in no
erosion of constitutional rights. Finally, this discussion will attempt
to show that, assuming that the majority's holding with respect to
the involuntariness of Fulminante's confession was correct, the
Court correctly held that the error of admitting that confession was
not harmless. These three positions are not inconsistent with one
another, as Justice Kennedy's brief concurring opinion illustrates.
II.

FACT SUMMARY

On September 14, 1982, Oreste Fulminante called the Mesa,
Arizona Police Department to report that his eleven year-old stepdaughter, Jeneane, had disappeared. 3 Fulminante had been caring
4
for Jeneane while her mother, Mary, was hospitalized for surgery.
Two days after Fulminante reported her disappearance, a passer-by
discovered Jeneane's body in the desert outside Mesa. 5 She had
been shot twice in the head with a large caliber weapon at close
range, and had a cloth ligature tied around her neck. 6 Because the
body was badly decomposed, it could not be determined whether
Jeneane had been sexually assaulted. 7 Fulminante's statements to
police concerning Jeneane contained a number of inconsistencies,
and he became a suspect in her killing.8 When the Arizona authorities did not file any charges against him, however, Fulminante left
Arizona. 9
During the investigation into Jeneane's death, the Arizona police discovered that Fulminante had previously been convicted of a
felony in NewJersey1 ° In addition, the police learned that just one
day prior to his call to the Mesa Police reporting Jeneane's disappearance, Fulminante had purchased an extra barrel for his .357 revolver. 1 After receiving this information from the Arizona police,
federal authorities arrested Fulminante in NewJersey on the charge
of possession of a firearm by a felon. 12 Fulminante was returned to
3 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)

(No. 89-839).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
8 Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 240-241 (1988). Fulminante told police that
he had a good relationship with his stepdaughter and had instructed her in the use of
firearms. Both of these claims were contradicted by Jeneane's mother.
9 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
10 Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 241.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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Arizona and convicted in U.S. District Court on the firearm
charges.1 3 After serving a sentence in a federal prison in Missouri,
Fulminante was released, only to be arrested and convicted of another firearm violation. 14 On this second conviction, the district
court sentenced Fulminante to the Ray Brook Federal Correctional
Institution in New York.15
While at Ray Brook, Fulminante became friends with Anthony
Sarivola, a fellow inmate and former police Officer. 16 Sarivola was
at one time involved in organized crime, but had since become a
7
paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).'
Sarivola was serving a sixty-day sentence at Ray Brook for extortion,
and during that time, posed as an organized crime figure.' 8
After becoming friends with Fulminante, Sarivola heard a rumor in the prison that Fulminante might have killed a child in Arizona. 19 When Sarivola questioned him about the rumor, Fulminante
denied that it was true and during the course of several conversations gave Sarivola a variety of other explanations for Jeneane's
death.2 0 Sarivola reported these conversations to his FBI contact,
21
who instructed him to obtain more information.
In October 1983, during a conversation between Sarivola and
Fulminante, Sarivola said that he knew Fulminante had been getting
"some tough treatment" from other inmates because of the rumor. 22 Sarivola further told Fulminante that he would help him if
he told him the story.2 3 Later that evening, Fulminante admitted to
Sarivola that he had taken Jeneane to the desert on his motorcycle,
choked and sexually assaulted her and that after making her beg for
her life, he had shot her twice in the head. 24 In addition, Fulminante told Sarivola that he had hidden the murder weapon in a pile
25
of rocks at the murder scene.
13 Id

14 Id
'5
16
17
18

Id

Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
Id
Id.

19 Id,
20 Id. Fulminante's "other" explanations included a story that Jeneane had been
killed by bikers looking for drugs.
21 Id

22 Id.
23 Id. Sarivola's exact words to Fulminante were, "You have to tell me about it, you
know. I mean, in other words, for me to give you any help."
24 Id.
25 Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 241 (1988).

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Sarivola was released from Ray Brook in November 1983.26
Fulminante was released in May 1984, at which time Sarivola and his
fiancee, Donna, met him at a local bus terminal.2 7 When Donna
asked Fulminante whether he had friends or relatives he wanted to
see, Fulminante indicated that he could not return to Arizona because he had killed a little girl there. 28 Fulminante proceeded to
give Donna details ofJeneane's murder. 2 9 Sarivola and Donna then
drove Fulminante to a friend's house in Pennsylvania.3 0 In September 1984, Fulminante was indicted in Arizona for the first-degree
murder ofJeneane. 3 '
III.
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

TRIAL

In December 1985, a jury found Fulminante guilty of the first
degree murder of his stepdaughter. 32 Prior to trial, Fulminante had
moved to suppress both the statement he had given to Sarivola in
prison and the statement he had given to Donna following his release from prison.3 3 Fulminante argued that the confession to
Sarivola was coerced and that the confession to Donna was the
"fruit" of the first. 34 The trial court denied the motion in a pre-trial

hearing, and admitted both confessions into evidence at the trial.3 5
In addition, the trial court found, in a special verdict, that
Fulminante had committed the murder in an especially cruel, heinous and depraved manner.3 6 Finding no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to overcome these aggravating circumstances, the court
37
sentenced Fulminante to death.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1250.
Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 241.
Id.
29 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Fulminante (No. 89-839).
30 Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 241.
31 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1250 (1991).
32 Id at 1251.
33 Id. at 1250.
34 Id. at 1251. With the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument, Fulminante maintained that since the confession to Sarivola was allegedly the result of a violation of
defendant's fifth amendment rights, the later confession to Donna might be inadmissible
as the "fruit" of the first. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 246. The second confession would be
admissible under those circumstances, however, if the taint of the illegally obtained confession had been sufficiently attenuated by the passage of time or by the presence of
intervening circumstances. Id.
35 Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 241.
36 Id.
37 Id.
26
27
28

1992]
B.

COERCED CONFESSIONS

APPEAL

Fulminante appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona. 38 On
appeal, Fulminante argued, among other things, that the confessions at issue were coerced and their admission at trial violated his
rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.3 9
Examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding Fulminante's confession to Sarivola, the Arizona Supreme Court found
that the trial court erred in finding that the confession to Sarivola
was voluntary. 40 The court also found, however, that the confession
to Donna should have been admitted, as it was not the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 4 1 The court concluded that the invalid first confes42
sion was merely cumulative of the admissible second confession.
In addition, the court found that based on the overwhelming evidence contained in the second confession, the jury would have had
enough evidence to convict respondent on the basis of that confession alone. 4 3 As a result, the court held that the error of admitting
the first confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 4 Accordingly, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
45
judgment of death.
C.

RECONSIDERATION

Fulminante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
granted on April 11, 1989.46 On July 11, 1989, the Arizona
47
Supreme Court filed a Supplemental Opinion.
In that opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with Fulminante that it had erred in holding that the confession to Sarivola was
harmless error. 4 8 The court stated that federal constitutional law
precluded its holding that admission of a coerced confession to a
government agent was harmless error. 4 9 Although the court had
held in its previous opinion that where a proper second confession
exists, an earlier confession is harmless error, it reversed that hold38

39
40
41
42
43
44

161 Ariz. 237 (1988).
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991).
Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.

45 Id. at 261.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 Id. at 261-262.
49 Id. at 262.
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ing on the grounds that the cases on which it had relied were not
cases that involved a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 50 Those
cases instead involved Miranda51 violations. 52 The court concluded
that where a first confession is coerced, and therefore violative of
due process, admission of that first confession cannot be harmless
error, despite the fact that a second, admissible confession exists. 53
The court set aside the conviction and sentence and remanded the
54
cause for a new trial.
Justice Cameron, the author of the original opinion, dissented,
arguing that the confession to Sarivola was coerced only in a "technical" sense.5 5 The "coercion" present in Fulminante's confession
did not involve the same egregious conduct as that present in the
cases cited by the supplemental opinion majority for its holding that
coerced confessions are not subject to harmless error analysis. 56
Rather than accept a rule that would never permit harmless error to
be applied to coerced confessions, Justice Cameron argued in favor
of recognizing an exception to that rule where the involuntary confession merely duplicates other testimony or admissible statements
57
offered by the accused.
IV.

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

After filing a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
Sept. 19, 1989,58 the State of Arizona appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. 59
A.

MAJORITY OPINIONS

The widely divergent views with respect to coerced confessions
and the harmless error doctrine are reflected in the fact that the
Court's resolution of the three separate issues was articulated by
three different majorities. Justice White 60 wrote for the majority on
the issue of whether Fulminante's confession was voluntary; Chief
50 Id. at 261.
51 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52 Fulminante, 161 Ariz. at 261.
53 Id. at 262.

Id.
55 Id. at 263, 265 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 268 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 267 (Cameron, J., dissenting).
54

58 Id. at 237.
59 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
60 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia joined Justice White in this por-

tion of the majority opinion.
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Justice Rehnquist 6 wrote the majority opinion with respect to
whether harmless error analysis may be applied to the erroneous
admission of an involuntary, or coerced, confession; and Justice
White 6 2 articulated the majority's opinion on the determination of
.whether the specific error of admitting the coerced confession of
Fulminante to Sarivola was harmless.
1.

Voluntariness

In resolving the issue of voluntariness, Justice White, writing
for the Court, first rejects the State's argument that the lower court
applied a "but for" test 63 to determine whether the confession to
Sarivola was involuntary, or coerced, 64 when it should have viewed
the confession in the "totality of the circumstances." 65 Although
the Arizona Supreme Court cited Bram v. United States,6 6 which no
longer states the test for voluntariness, neither the case nor its rule
was relied upon by the lower court for its holding. 6 7 Rather, the
Arizona Supreme Court applied the correct test, which required
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances." 68
Next, Justice White agrees with the Arizona Supreme Court's
finding that the confession to Sarivola was coerced. 69 Justice
White's majority finds Fulminante's fear of physical violence from
61 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist in this

portion of the majority opinion.
62 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Kennedy joined Justice White in this
portion of the majority opinion.
63 A "but for" test would rely solely on a theory of causation whereby a court could
determine that the challenged confession would not have been obtained absent the coercive acts in question.
64 The Court indicates that prior confession cases have used "coerced" and "involuntary" interchangeably and that the Court uses coerced in the present case only to
preserve consistency with the language of the Arizona Supreme Court. Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 n.3 (1991).
65 Id. at 1251. A "totality of the circumstances" analysis requires the court to examine all of the circumstances surrounding the challenged confession to determine
whether the confessor made the statement voluntarily. A voluntary statement may be
defined in a variety of ways, one of which may equate voluntariness with a decision that
is the product of an unrestrained will, or a will that has not been overborne. Id. at 1261
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
66 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Bram decision stated that a voluntary confession is one
that has not been obtained by "any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by
the exertion of any proper influence." Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES at
478 (6th ed.)).
67 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
68 Id. at 1252. The "totality of the circumstances" analysis replaced the Brain test for
determining voluntariness at least as early as Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)
and Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963). See CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 32 (James B. Haddad, et al. eds., 3d ed. 1987).
69 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252.
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other prisoners absent any protection from Sarivola analogous to
the factors that motivated the defendant in Payne v. Arkansas70 to
confess. 7' The Court holds that Fulminante's will was overborne in
a way that rendered his confession the product of coercion. 72 Justice
White relies on a number of factors not relied upon by the Arizona
Supreme Court to support this finding of coercion, including Fulminante's previous experience with the prison system. 7 3 The White
majority concludes, based on these considerations, that the confession was involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial.
2. Applicability of the Harmless ErrorAnalysis
In this portion of the decision, Justice Rehnquist points out that
since the introduction of the modem harmless error analysis in
Chapman v. California,74 the Court has analyzed a wide range of errors in terms of harmless error and has decided that most constitu75
tional errors may be considered harmless.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that Chapman does not actually
stand for the proposition that admission of a coerced confession
may never be harmless error. 7 6 Instead, Chapman simply mentions

coerced confessions in its eighth footnote, which lists prior cases
that have held that some errors may never be harmless. 77 The Chapman court cited the Payne7 8 decision in this footnote, 79 and the dissent in the present case cites Payne for the proposition that coerced
70 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (police officer's promise of protection from an angry mob

outside the jail in exchange for a confession).
71 Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. at 1253.
72 Id.
73 Id at 1252 n.2. Justice White concludes that Fulminante was especially susceptible
to coercion since he is a physically small man with average intelligence. Id. In addition,
Justice White points out that Fulminante had "felt threatened by the [prison) population" when he had previously been incarcerated at age twenty-six. Id. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, also relies upon the fact that Fulminante had been in prison before,
but does so in order to show that Fulminante was a seasoned veteran of sorts who
should not have been easily coerced. See id. at 1262-63 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in
part).
74 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman decision marked the first Supreme Court decision permitting a trial error that violated a defendant's federal constitutional rights to be
deemed harmless rather than requiring automatic reversal of the conviction. Id.
75 Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. at 1263.
76 Id. at 1264. By using this argument, Justice Rehnquist seems able to avoid explicitly extending the holding of Chapman.
77 Id.

78 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (holding that the admission in evidence of a coerced confession vitiates the judgment of conviction because it violates the mandates of 14th Amendment due process).
79 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
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confessions may never be harmless error.8 0 However, the majority
argues that the analysis rejected in Payne was not actually the harmless error analysis later adopted in Chapman, but was instead an earlier, much more lenient rule.8 1 Justice Rehnquist concedes that the
Payne decision correctly rejected a test that would make the admission of a coerced confession essentially risk-free for the state, but
argues that this does not require rejection of Chapman's harmless
82
error analysis in cases of coerced confessions.
The ChiefJustice, then, does not use Payne to draw the line for
errors which are never potentially harmless, and does not believe
that Payne prohibits the use of harmless error analysis in cases of
coerced confessions. Instead, Justice Rehnquist distinguishes potentially harmless errors from those that may never be harmless by
arguing that the former always involve "trial error", or error which
occurs during presentation of the case to the jury, rather than error
which reflects a structural defect in the constitution of the trial
83
mechanism itself.
Although Justice Rehnquist does not believe Payne should be
read to prevent application of harmless error analysis to coerced
confessions, he does distinguish coerced confessions from the two
other errors mentioned in footnote 8 of Chapman. This distinction
can be understood in terms of his "trial error"/"structural error"
analysis. The admission of a coerced confession, he argues, is a
classic "trial error" and is similar in degree and kind to erroneous
admission of other types of evidence.8 4 The deprivation of the right
to counsel8 5 and the presence of an impartial judge,8 6 however, are
structural defects, or defects in the framework within which the trial
occurs, which affect the entire trial from beginning to end.8

7

Such

errors.8 8

structural defects can never be harmless
The Rehnquist
majority also cites the right to self-representation and the right to a
public trial as members of this class of errors exempt from harmless
error analysis.8 9
Justice Rehnquist states that he has found no reason to treat
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1264.
82 Id at 1264-65.
83 Id. at 1264-65. This distinction will be discussed further. See infra part V.B.
84 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-1265.
85 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
87 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
80

81

88 Id.
89 Id.
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differently statements elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment 90
and the statements elicited from Fulminante, which arguably violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 He rejects the assertion made
in Justice White's dissent that there is something more "fundamental" about coerced confessions that requires assigning more weight
to those errors than to other "trial errors." 9 2 Although Justice
Rehnquist recognizes that admitting a coerced confession into evidence may have a more dramatic effect on a trial than certain other
errors might, he denies that this is sufficient reason to render all
such confessions immune from harmless error analysis. 93 In cases
where such a dramatic admission is in fact harmful to the defendant,
the harmless error analysis should nevertheless be employed, but
94
will not permit the error to actually be deemed harmless.
3. Harmlessness of the Present Error
Justice White, writing for the Court, defines the test for determining harmlessness as the test from Chapman v. California,95 requiring that an error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 6 Justice

White also states that a confession is perhaps the most damaging
evidence that can be brought against a defendant. 9 7 A coerced confession not only carries a high risk of unreliability, but in addition
has a profound effect on thejury. 98 The White majority warns that a

court must be extremely cautious before determining that the admission of a coerced confession was harmless. 9 9
Justice White argues that three factors weigh in favor of holding
the present error not harmless. 10 0 First, the State recognized that a
successful prosecution depended on the jury's belief of the two confessions. 10 1 The prosecutor conceded that the physical evidence
was short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 2 Thus admission
of the first confession could not have been harmless if it was a necessary component of the prosecution's case. Second, if the first confes90 See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (admission of statement obtained in
violation of Sixth Amendment subject to harmless error analysis).
91 Fulminante, 11l S. Ct. at 1265.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1266.
94 Id.

95 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
96 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1257.
97 Id.

98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
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sion to Sarivola had not been admitted, the jurors might not have
believed Donna's story that Fulminante confessed to her.1 0 3 Circumstantial evidence corroborated some, but not all, of the details
of the confession to Donna. 10 4 In addition, Fulminante's motive
and state of mind were only corroborated by the first confession.105
Thus one confession could not be said to be merely cumulative of
the other.1 0 6 Third, the admission of the first confession led to the
10 7
admission of additional evidence that prejudiced Fulminante.
For example, evidence pertaining to Sarivola's character portrayed
Fulminante as one who willingly associated with criminals.10 8 In addition, evidence provided by the confession to Sarivola concerning
the way in which the crime was committed was influential in the trial
judge's decision to sentence Fulminante to death. 10 9
For these reasons, the White majority holds that the erroneous
admission of the confession to Sarivola may not be considered
harmless.1 10 Thus the Court affirms the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Arizona. 1 '
B.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Dissenting on the first issue, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, disagreed with the majority's
holding that the confession to Sarivola was coerced.1 12 Justice
White dissented from the Rehnquist majority's holding that harmless error analysis may be applied to the erroneous admission of coerced confessions."t 3 Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
joined Justice White in this dissenting opinion.' 1 4 Finally, Justice
Rehnquist wrote for himself, as well as Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, when he refused to hold that application of the harmless error analysis resulted in a finding that the present error was in fact
103 Id
104 Id. at 1259. The majority notes that Fulminante's statements concerning the choking and sexual assault ofJeneane were not corroborated by circumstantial evidence. Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1259.
107 Id
108 Id at 1260.
109 Id. The sentencing judge apparently relied exclusively on the two confessions in
finding that Fulminante committed the crime in an especially "heinous and depraved"
manner. See id. at 1260. Based on this finding, the judge sentenced Fulminante to
death. Id.
110 Id. at 1261.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1263 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
113 Id. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting in part).
114 Id.

860
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not harmless.1 1 5
1.

Voluntariness

Justice Rehnquist defines the test of voluntariness as whether
16
the confession is the product of a free and unconstrained choice.'
If one's will has been overborne, the confession offends due process
1 17
requirements.
The Chief Justice states that the facts of the present case differ
significantly from previous cases in which the Court held that defendant's will had beep overborne.1 1 8 For example, Fulminante offered no evidence that he believed his life was in danger or that he
confessed to Sarivola in order to obtain protection. 119 In addition,
Fulminante and Sarivola had engaged in relatively brief conversations, and Sarivola never prevented Fulminante from leaving his
company.12 0 Furthermore, Sarivola never threatened Fulminante or
demanded that he confess. 12 1 Justice Rehnquist argues that these
factors add up to an entirely different picture than those of previous
cases of involuntariness, and that based on these differences, the
Court's holding that the confession was involuntary, or coerced, defines that concept more broadly than the Court's previous decisions
22
warrant.1
2. Applicability of Harmless ErrorAnalysis
Justice White argues that the Court, by extending Chapman, has
abandoned the principle found in Rogers v. Richmond. 1 2 3 The Rogers
court held that a criminal defendant is deprived of due process if his
conviction is founded, even in part, upon an involuntary confession,
regardless of whether the confession is true or whether there is am24
ple evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. 1
115 Id. at 1266 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part). Justice Souter did not appear to
join eitherJustice Rehnquist orJustice White on this third issue, nor did he file a separate opinion. Id. at 1249.
116 Id. at 1261 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).

117 Id.

118 Id. at 1262 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
119 Id.

Id. at 1263 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
365 U.S. 534 (1961). Unlike Justice Rehnquist, Justice White sees the majority's
opinion on the applicability of harmless error analysis as an overly broad expansion,
rather than an application of the Chapman decision. Seesupra note 76. In addition, Justice
White argues that the expansion constitutes a repudiation of Rogers' important due process protections. See Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (White, J., dissenting in part).
120
121
122
123

124 Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-541.
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This principle has been upheld even in cases such as Haynes v. Washington 12 5 and Payne v. Arkansas,' 2 6 where other, proper confessions

27
were admitted into evidence.1
Justice White then argues that a coerced confession is fundamentally different from other types of erroneously admitted evidence to which the harmless error analysis may be applied.' 28 In
making this argument, he relies on the fact that Chapman quite literally noted 129 that this type of error, as well as deprivation of counsel
and trial before an impartial judge may not be categorized as harm130

less error.

He also argues that the majority's dichotomy between "trial errors" and "structural errors" is meaningless. Since both errors may
occur at precisely the same stage in the trial process, the majority's
analysis simply does not work. 13 For example, the Court's prior
decisions have permitted the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence to be analyzed in terms of harmless error,
but not the failure to instruct a jury on the reasonable doubt
32
standard.'
A more plausible explanation for these results, according to
Justice White, is that constitutional due process does not require a
13 3
jury instruction on the presumption of innocence in every case.
The presumption of innocence instruction merely provides an additional due process safeguard to the instruction on reasonable doubt,
which the Constitution does require in every case.' 3 4 The reasonable doubt instruction's fundamental nature is derived from the fact
that it is impossible to assess the effect on the jury of its omission.'13
This creates the risk that the jury will convict even though the state
36
has not met its required burden of proof.'
Justice White believes the same concerns and uncertainties involved in determining what weight a jury has given damaging evidence or omissions support his argument against applying harmless
error analysis to the admission of a coerced confession.' 3 7 He em125 373 U.S. 503 (1963).

126 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
127 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting in part).
128 Id.

129 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
130 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting in part).
131 Id. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting in part).
132
133
134
135
136

Id.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
137 Id.
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phasizes that evidence of a confession can damage a defendant's
case more than any other kind of evidence. 138 However, Justice
White acknowledges two situations in which the Court has permitted analysis of confessions in terms of harmless error: admission of
a confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,' 3 9 and admission of incriminating statements taken in violation of Miranda140 requirements.14 ' Justice White distinguishes
these cases by arguing that neither the Sixth Amendment cases nor
the Miranda cases involve a specifically coerced confession or the
two distinctive reasons underlying the exclusion of that type of in14 2
voluntary statement.
The first of these reasons, he argues, is that some coerced confessions may be unreliable. 14 3 Admission of these unreliable statements would distort the truth-seeking function of the trial. 14 4
Second, the methods used to obtain involuntary confessions offend
the underlying principle in our legal system that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.' 4 5 Our society has a strong belief that governments sacrifice important human values when they
46
force a confession out of an accused against his will.'
In sum, Justice White argues that there are some constitutional
errors which should never be considered harmless errors because
they violate rights that protect important human values unrelated to
the truth-seeking function of the trial. 14 7 Justice White also argues
that the principle of stare decisis is fundamentally important to the
rule of law and states that the majority offers no convincing reason
for overturning the long line of decisions requiring the exclusion of
14 8
coerced confessions.
3.

Harmlessness of Present Error

Justice Rehnquist argues briefly that the present case represents
a "classic case" of harmless error, since the second confession gave
even more details of the crime than the first confession and was
138
139
140
141
142

Id.

See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting in part).

143 Id.
144 Id.

145 Id.
146 Id.

147 Id. at 1257 (White, J., dissenting in part).
148 Id.
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properly admitted into evidence. 149
C.

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Kennedy, in a separate concurring opinion, emphasizes
that he does not believe the confession to Sarivola was coerced, but
states that he will accept the holding of the five Justices' 50 who
found coercion. 15 1 Justice Kennedy does not, however, join in Justice White's opinion on the voluntariness issue. Although Justice
Kennedy's stated rationale for accepting the holding of involuntariness is to provide a "clear mandate" to the Arizona Supreme Court,
it is not at all clear from his opinion why he believes that his sixth
"vote" will achieve this result. 15 2
Justice Kennedy also argues, however, assuming that the admission of the confession was erroneous, that the Court correctly determines that harmless error analysis should be applied to coerced
confessions.1 5 3 Nevertheless, he does not agree with Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Scalia in their opinion that the present error
was harmless, but argues instead, as Justice White does, that under
the present circumstances, the present error could not be consid154
ered harmless.
V.
A.

ANALYSIS

VOLUNTARINESS

Although the majority purports to analyze the voluntariness of
Fulminante's confession in terms of the proper "totality of the circumstances" test, 155 the result reached by the majority is impermissibly expansive of prior holdings of involuntariness. In addition, the
holding does not reflect a reasonable consideration of whether the
particular circumstances in question in fact caused the particular
149 Id at 1266 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).

150 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia.
151 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1266, (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
152 Id. at 1267 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1266-67. (Kennedy,J., concurring in thejudgment).Justice Kennedy stresses
that when a court is applying harmless error analysis to an error, it must appreciate the
great impact a full confession is likely to have on the trier of fact. Id. at 1266. This
impact can be distinguished from the effect of an isolated statement that is only incriminating to the defendant when linked with other evidence. Id. Because Justice Kennedy
argues that harmless error analysis should apply, he must believe that in some circumstances erroneous admission of a coerced confession may be harmless. However, it appears that he would proceed with great caution in such situations, due to the inherently
damaging nature of a full confession.
155 Id. at 1252.
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suspect's will to be overborne. If the court chooses to ignore the
significance of the circumstances it examines, the totality of the circumstances test loses its meaning and instead begins to resemble a
per se rule of exclusion. A true totality analysis most likely would
show that Fulminante's confession in fact was not coerced.
The ChiefJustice, in dissent, correctly points out that the prior
cases in which the Court has held that a confession was involuntary
involved circumstances that are very far removed from the circumstances surrounding Fulminante's confession.' 5 6 Both the majority
and the dissenters cite Miller v. Fenton 157 and acknowledge that the
legal question of voluntariness requires an independent determination by the reviewing court. 5 8 However, the Miller principle cannot
be read to mean that the Court is free to depart from prior holdings
outlining the boundaries of voluntariness each time it makes a determination as to the voluntariness of a particular confession.
Even the prior voluntariness cases cited by the majority illustrate Justice White's inappropriate extension of the voluntariness
doctrine in the present case. These cases, Watts v. Indiana,159 Blackburn v. Alabama, 160 Culombe v. Connecticut,' 6 1 Reck v. Pate1 62 and Payne

all involve circumstances radically different from those in Fulminante.
For example, Watts involved physical and mental mistreatment of
the suspect prior to his confession.' 63 Not only was the suspect held
and interrogated for several days in solitary confinement in a cell
called "the hole", there was evidence that he had been deprived of
basic needs such as food and sleep.'" 4 Fulminante alleged no such
mistreatment by Sarivola or anyone else in the period of time leading up to his confession.
The majority's reliance on Blackburn, Culombe and Reck is similarly misplaced. Blackburn had been diagnosed as a "schizophrenic
... paranoid type.., insane, incompetent ....1 165 Further, authorities had subjected Blackburn to interrogation for eight or nine
hours by several officers, at times three at once. 166 Similarly, authorities held and questioned Culombe for four nights and five days, and
156

Id. at 1262 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).

157 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
158

Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1252, 1261 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 110).

159
160
161
162

338
361
367
367

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

49 (1949).
199 (1960).
568 (1961).
433 (1961).

163 Watts, 338 U.S. at 52-53.
164 Id.

165 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 202 (1960).
166 Id. at 204.
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the Court held that because Culombe was very "suggestible and
subject to intimidation. . .", the circumstances were sufficient to
show that his powers of resistance could not have overcome the interrogation procedures.1 67 Finally, Reck was a mentally retarded
nineteen year-old whose intelligence level was that of someone ten
or twelve years old. 16 8 The Reck Court was also influenced by the
fact that the defendant had no prior experience with the police prior
1 69
to being detained by them for eight days without a hearing.
All three of these decisions stand for the proposition that coercion may be mental or emotional and need not be physical. However, Fulminante possessed none of the characteristics that caused
the Court to find that the wills of these prior defendants had been
overborne. The factors considered by Justice White in footnote 2 to
illustrate that Fulminante was susceptible to coercion are only superficially similar to the circumstances of previous cases. Fulminante's physical size cannot be analogized to physical mistreatment
or severe intimidation. In addition, although Fulminante's intelligence may have been low-average or average, and he may have at
one time received psychiatric treatment, he was by no means incompetent or functioning at a child's level. Therefore, a higher level of
influential behavior may have been required to constitute coercion
in his case. Nor is the fact that he had allegedly felt "threatened by
the [prison] population" 170 during one of his prior incarcerations
particularly persuasive in the present case. Therefore the present
circumstances in their totality cannot be said to be sufficiently analogous to prior cases of coerced confessions to warrant the present
finding of coercion.
Perhaps the majority's most misplaced analogy is Payne. The
majority seems to think that the "fear of physical violence ... which
motivated Fulminante to confess" is quite similar to the suspect's
fear in Payne. 171 However, the situations in the two cases are really
quite different. Payne was faced with choosing between a promise
of protection by a police officer if he confessed and "an angry mob
167 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 625 (1961). Although Justice White attempts to describe Fulminante with language similar to that used by the Culombe court,
the two men were not really similarly "susceptible." See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.
Ct. 1246, 1252 n.2 (1991). The court in Culombe described the defendant as a "mental
defective of the moron class." Culombe, 367 U.S. at 620. Such language was clearly
meant to indicate some form of retardation. Based on Justice White's characterization
of Fulminante as a man of "average" intelligence, a comparison of the susceptibility of
Culombe and Fulminante is not appropriate. See Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252 n.2.
168 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 435 (1961).
169 Id. at 44 1.
170 Fulminante, II1 S. Ct. at 1252 n.2.
171 Id. at 1253.
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outside the jailhouse door."1 72 The danger for Payne was obviously
much more immediate and certain than the danger for Fulminante.
Sarivola was aware that Fulminante had allegedly been receiving
rough treatment because of the rumors that he had killed a child.
However, it was not at all certain that any real harm would come to
Fulminante if he did not confess. In addition, the danger was not
immediate and did not call for a hurried decision to confess. There
was no angry mob waiting outside his cell to tear him limb from
limb if he did not confess. It must be conceded, however, that if
Fulminante reasonably perceived such a danger and believed that
Sarivola could protect him if he confessed, the fact that the danger
was not imminent or certain to occur would not prevent the confession from being coerced. However, the evidence does not support
such a finding, as will be discussed below.
Although the majority acknowledges that the question of voluntariness in Fulminante's case is a "close one,"' 17 3 the Court holds the
confession to Sarivola to be involuntary without any discussion of
the particular events surrounding Fulminante's confession, or
Fulminante's perception of these events. These omissions result in
an analysis that is inconsistent with the reasoning in the cases cited
by the Court for its holding, discussed above.
In its analysis of the totality of the circumstances, the majority
fails to consider certain subjective factors that indicate that although
a suspect's will might have been overborne in the present circumstances, Fulminante's will was not in fact overborne. These subjective factors, although perhaps not dispositive, are at least significant
to the voluntariness inquiry. However, the majority relies solely on
the objective finding of the Arizona Supreme Court that there was a
credible threat of physical violence for its holding that Sarivola coerced Fulminante into confessing. 1 74 However, the Chief Justice's
dissent properly points to the fact that at the suppression hearing,
Fulminante did not dispute that he at no time indicated that he was
in fear of other inmates nor did he ever seek Mr. Sarivola's "protection."' 175 This evidence would seem to indicate that although in
some circumstances a person in Fulminante's situation might have
confessed in order to receive protection, Fulminante did not in fact
confess because he was in need of Sarivola's protection.
The majority assumes that the fact that a credible threat of danger may have existed for Fulminante means that Fulminante per172 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-565, 567 (1958).
173 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252.
174 Id. at

1253.

175 Id. at 1262 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
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ceived this danger and was motivated by the danger to such an
extent that the Court could say his will had been overborne. It is
conceivable that Sarivola coerced Fulminante with a credible threat,
rather than actual violence; however, the record appears to contain
no evidence that that was the case. 176 On the contrary, the dissent
correctly points to factors considered in prior voluntariness decisions and ignored by the majority in Fulminante to show that Fulminante confessed of his own unconstrained will. These factors
include the brevity of the conversations between Fulminante and
Sarivola, Fulminante's freedom at all times to leave Sarivola's presence or refuse to talk with him, and Fulminante's previous experi1 77
ence with prisons and law enforcement.
The final result of the majority's voluntariness analysis is a departure from the line of cases that define a voluntary confession as
one that is'the product of a free and unconstrained choice. 178 By
relying solely on an objective view of the circumstances surrounding
the confession, the majority has effectively reduced the totality rule
to a new rule. This new rule seems to provide that where the confessor might have been improperly motivated to make a confession,
the confession will be held involuntary, regardless of whether the
confession was in fact the product of a constrained choice, or an
overborne will. The White majority's rule is an extension of the
boundaries of involuntariness that is unwarranted by prior cases. 179
B.

APPLICABILITY OF HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS

The Rehnquist majority correctly determines that involuntary,
or coerced, confessions may be analyzed in terms of harmless error.
The majority correctly points out that many other constitutional errors have been held to be subject to harmless error analysis since
the Chapman decision. Presuming all constitutional errors carry
176 See iL at 1262 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). In addition, the Arizona
Supreme Court emphasized certain facts in the record that, although used to support a
penalty of death, actually may suggest other motivations for Fulminante's confession.
The Court noted that Fulminante's confessions to Sarivola and Donna both contained
many unsolicited details--"statements of a man who was bragging and relishing the
crime he committed." Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 256 (1988). In addition,
Fulminante told Donna that he wanted to .'go piss on UJeneane's] grave."' Id. at 256.
Therefore, Fulminante may have confessed to Sarivola in order to brag about his
actions.
177 Justice Rehnquist, like Justice White, emphasizes the fact that Fulminante had
been in prison before. Justice Rehnquist, however, does so to point out that Sarivola
should not have been particularly susceptible to coercion since he was no stranger to
prison life. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
178 Id. at 1261 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
179 Id. at 1263 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
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equal weight, there would seem to be no prima facie reason, then, to
exclude the erroneous admission of involuntary confessions from
harmless error analysis. Although the dissenters' reliance on Payne
v. Arkansas 18 0 for the proposition that erroneous admission of coerced confessions may never be harmless is somewhat convincing,
particularly in light of principles of stare decisis, there is reason to
believe, as Justice Rehnquist does, that the Payne court actually rejected an analysis quite different from the modern harmless error
18 1
doctrine announced nine years later in Chapman.
Rejection of the belief that footnote 8 of Chapman (citing Payne)
precludes application of harmless error analysis in cases of coerced
confessions presents a serious problem, however, in that it may
erode any distinction between errors which may be harmless and
those which may never be harmless. However, rejection of Justice
Rehnquist's "trial error"/"structural error" distinction to counter
the "erosion of constitutional rights" criticism does not necessarily
require a concession that such an erosion is certain to occur after
Fulminante.
The Supreme Court has, as Justice Rehnquist points out in the
majority opinion, applied the harmless error doctrine to a wide variety of errors, including constitutional errors.' 8 2 Two of the constitutional errors have included a violation of the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause by an improper comment on a defendant's silence at trial,' 8 3 and admission of a confession obtained in
violation of Massiah v. United States 184 principles. 8 5 The application
of harmless error analysis to these errors cannot effectively be distinguished from application of harmless error in the case of a coerced confession, unless one believes, as Justice White does, that
there is something "fundamentally different"' 8 6 about a confession
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment that warrants a
special per se rule of exclusion.
180 356 U.S. 560 (1957).
181 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
182 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263.
183 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
184 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah held that incriminating

statements deliberately elicited by federal agents from an accused against whom adversary proceedings, such as
indictment, had already been initiated, in the absence of his attorney, deprived the accused of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and were, therefore, inadmissible at trial. Id.
185 Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). The Milton decision held that the use
at trial of incriminating statements that had been deliberately elicited from the defendant by law enforcement agents after defendant had been indicted and out of the presence of his counsel violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id.
186 Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1254.
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Although the Chapman court pointed out in footnote 8 that
three prior cases had held that certain errors could never be subject
to harmless error analysis, the court did not attempt to explain the
reasoning behind the decisions. 18 7 The only rationale offered by
the Chapman court was that those three prior decisions had held that
some rights are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be seen as harmless .... "18 The court also indicated that the
harmless error doctrine carries with it the implication that errors
which affect "substantial rights" should not be treated as harmless.' 8 9 It seems difficult to argue that some constitutional errors
are "substantial" and others are not. Presumably all rights currently
protected by the Constitution were once seen as important enough
to warrant some "special" protection. Therefore, the distinction
between errors which may be harmless and the present error, which
the White majority argues may never be harmless, should not lie
solely in the fact that the present error is a violation of the more
"substantial" rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet this seems to be the implication of Justice White's dissenting opinion. He argues that the distinction lies in the fact that the
present confession was improperly elicited by coercion rather than
in violation of another constitutional mandate.19 0 He also states
that the reasons underlying exclusion of the former type of evidence
are distinct from the reasons one could give for excluding the latter. 191 However, aside from the Justice's concerns about unreliability, the only justification for this distinction is that involuntary
confessions are inherently more offensive to society than confessions obtained by other constitutionally inappropriate means, such
92
as violation of Sixth Amendment rights.'
Justice White's argument, however, does not explain what renders some constitutional violations more offensive than others, and
why this should necessarily result in disparate treatment of seemingly similar wrongs. If the Chapman court was correct in asserting
that "substantial rights" preclude harmless error analysis in some
cases, those rights should be defined in such a way that eliminates or
at least diminishes the need for a system of ranking the importance
of various constitutional rights that is incapable of delineation.
Although it is true that judges are often called upon to place certain
187

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).

188 Id. at
189 Id.
190

23.

Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting in part).

191 Id.
192 Id.
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values on different constitutional provisions, to require them to
compare and rank various rights arbitrarily is to require judges to
act beyond the scope of their office and will produce largely incon93
sistent results.'
It may seem at this point that if one is unwilling to say that some
constitutional rights are more "important" than others, without any
concrete definitional criteria, 19 4 then inevitably all errors, constitutional and otherwise, are placed on equal footing and are therefore
all subject to harmless error analysis. In fact, Justice Rehnquist's
argument with respect to Chapman's footnote 8 seems to lead to precisely that point. The Chief Justice in his opinion argues that Chapman does not actually adopt the rule that an involuntary confession
may not be analyzed in terms of harmless error, but instead "relegates" the cases standing for this idea to a footnote. 195 The Chief
Justice interprets this to mean that the reference to the Payne decision is merely
an historical reference rather than an adoption of its
"rule."' 196 The next logical step in this argument would be that the
other two cases cited in footnote 8 of Chapman 19 7 are also mere historical references, and are on more or less equal footing with Payne.
There would seem to be no logical basis, then, for exempting the
errors of those cases from harmless error analysis while permitting
it in the case of a Payne-type error.
The implications of this broad application of harmless error
analysis may raise serious concerns about the future of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. If Chapman in fact provides no
meaningful limitation on the harmless error doctrine, then any type
of error committed against a criminal defendant could be deemed
harmless, at the discretion of a reviewing judge. It appears that the
Chief Justice, however, is unwilling to follow his argument to that
193 For example, as Justice Rehnquist argued, the facts that often give rise to violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel sometimes involve police conduct that is
at least as offensive to abstract notions of "fairness" as conduct found in cases of invol-

untary confessions. Id. at 1266. See also Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). Yet Justice White would preclude harmless error
analysis only in the latter category of cases.
194 Justice White's argument that coerced confessions offend "important human values" arguably provides no concrete definitional guidelines, but is simply an abstract justification for sharply restricting the use of harmless error analysis generally. Cf
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting in part).
195 Id. at 1264.
196 Id.

197 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). In addition to Payne, the footnote cites Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel) and Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge) as cases in which harmless error analysis
could not be applied. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
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conclusion, since he refuses to say that deprivation of the right to
counsel and trial before an impartial judge can ever be harmless
198
error.
It would seem that the Chief Justice was aware that his disregard of the apparent distinction suggested by footnote 8 of Chapman
might subject him to criticism that he has opened the entire spectrum of constitutional errors to harmless error analysis. Justice
Rehnquist attempts to counter this criticism by arguing that a distinction can be drawn between the Payne, Gideon and Tumey cases,
listed in Chapman's footnote 8.199 The distinction, according to the
Chief Justice, can be seen in the fact that admission of an involuntary confession is a "classic 'trial error' " occurring during the presentation of the case to the jury, while the other two constitutional
violations referred to in Chapman's note 8 are "structural defects in
20 0
the constitution of the trial mechanism."
A "structural defects" error, he argues, affects the very framework of a trial, at all its stages. 2 0 Other errors of this type have
been defined by Supreme Court decisions since Chapman and were
properly excluded from harmless error analysis. 20 2 The common
thread in all of these cases is that the errors at issue prevented the
trial from serving its function as a fair and reliable determination of
guilt or innocence.
Justice White, however, correctly points out that two cases decided by the Supreme Court, Kentucky v. Whorton 20 3 and Jackson v.
Virginia,20 4 illustrate the failure of this "trial error"/"structural error" distinction. 20 5 The errors in both of these cases occurred at
exactly the same stage in the trial, yet only the error in Whorton was
analyzed in terms of harmless error. 20 6 The explanation for the exclusion of the Jackson error from harmless error analysis cannot be
explained by Justice Rehnquist's theory, because both were technically "trial errors" that occurred during the presentation of the case
to the jury. 2 07 The distinction, Justice White argues, is that a jury
instruction on reasonable doubt is required by the Constitution be198 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.

199 Id.
200 Id
201 1&j
202 Id. These include the right to self representation at trial, the right to a public trial,
and unlawful exclusion of members of defendant's race from a grand jury. Id.
203 441 U.S. 786 (1979)(failure to instruct thejury on the presumption of innocence).
204 443 U.S. 307 (1979)(failure to instruct thejury on the reasonable doubt standard).
205 Fulminante, 11 S. Ct. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting in part).
206 Id.
207 Id.
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cause it is impossible to determine on review what effect its omission
had on a jury.20 8 A jury instruction on the presumption of innocence, however, is not necessary in order to protect a defendant's
20 9
due process rights, but only serves as an additional safeguard.
Justice White recognizes that his argument concerning the difficulty in assessing the impact on the jury of the error in question
does not by itself justify a "per se bar to the use of any confession." 210 This is a concession that must be made in light of the use
of harmless error in Milton, where the error was, as in Fulminante,
admission of an improperly obtained confession. However, whereas
Justice White attempts to distinguish Milton from the present case
by arguing vague policy considerations, a better argument might be
made by using a version ofJustice White's own "impact on the jury"
argument to support the line drawn by the majority. Such an argument would advocate preventing harmless error analysis in cases
where the error was so broad in scope that the jury's deliberations
were necessarily flawed.
One might begin with a presumption that, as the majority argues, all errors which occur during the presentation of the case to
thejury (trial errors) are subject to harmless error analysis. 2 1 1 However, as Justice White has shown, to end the analysis here is to ignore the inconsistencies of cases such as Whorton and Jackson. The
next step, then, may be to argue that even a trial error could not be
analyzed in terms of harmless error if the error had caused the jury
to reach its decision based on reasoning that was necessarily and
critically flawed. This could be opposed on the ground that these
ideas are as vague and incapable of consistent application as Justice
21 2
White's notions of "human values" and "strongly felt attitude.
However, the two cases cited by Justice White in his criticism of the
trial error distinction support the idea that consistent application of
harmless error might be possible if the focus of the inquiry remains
on the error's effect on the reasoning processes of the jury.
The results in Whorton and Jackson, discussed above, can be understood if considered in terms of the effect of each error on the
relative ability of the jury to make a properly reasoned decision. As
Justice White points out, the effect on the jury of the judge's failure
Id.
Id.
Id.
211 This implicitly leaves in place the bar on analyzing so-called structural defects, a
category which even the dissenters would likely agree could be fairly defined to include
at least trial before an impartial judge and complete denial of the right to counsel.
212 Id. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting in part).
208
209
210
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to give an instruction on reasonable doubt, as was the case in Jackson, would be almost impossible to gauge or evaluate.2 13 This difficulty would arise because in the absence of that instruction, the jury
may be deliberating under a false assumption about what burden of
proof is necessary to find the defendant guilty.2 14 Justice White uses
this problem to illustrate that although the Jackson error is technically a trial error, it is a defect that "distorts the very structure of the
trial.. ." in a way that should prohibit it from ever being considered
harmless. 2 15 Nevertheless, the error is still a trial error. Perhaps
then, this error is excluded from the realm of harmless error because although the error technically occurred during the presentation of the case. to the jury, it rendered the jury's entire reasoning
process faulty from the beginning of the trial. This is due to the fact
that the jury could have convicted the defendant based on a false
assumption about the legal standard of proof.
Application of this argument to the Fulminante error weighs
heavily in favor of permitting application of the harmless error analysis. An improperly obtained confession, no matter what constitutional provision was violated in obtaining it, cannot be said to affect
the deliberations of a jury in the same way as the failure to instruct
on reasonable doubt, much less the failure to try a defendant in
front of an impartial judge or the failure to provide a defendant with
counsel. A confession may have, as Justice Rehnquist concedes, a
very "dramatic" effect on a trial. 2 16 Nevertheless, although damaging, it is only one piece of evidence in an entire case. Its admission
does not cause ajury to deliberate under any false assumption about
what the prosecution had to prove to sustain its burden of proof, or
about the state of the law.
In addition, admission of the confession did not distort every
other unrelated piece of evidence in the same way as if the jury had
been considering an entire body of evidence that had been skewed
by an impartial judge, or if the defendant had not had an adequate
chance to prepare any evidence at all because of a lack of counsel.
The Court's recent decision prohibiting harmless error analysis
where members of a defendant's own race had been unlawfully excluded from a grand jury2 17 can also be understood with this analysis. A trial or hearing before a racially skewed or even biased panel
213
214

Id. at 1255 (White, J., dissenting in part).
Id.

215 Id.
216
217

Id. at 1266.
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
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creates a very high risk that the reasoning of that panel is inherently
biased and therefore faulty.
This distinction may undoubtedly be criticized on the same
grounds as this Note has attempted to criticize justice White's valuebased distinction, namely that evaluation of the jury's reasoning may
be difficult and somewhat arbitrary. However, it can be argued that
a determination as to whether an error caused a jury's reasoning to
be flawed in a critical way, or in such a way as to preclude a properly
reasoned judgment, can be made much more objectively and consistently than determinations about which constitutional rights are
more highly valued by society and which constitutional violations
are the most offensive to abstract notions of fairness. To simply
state a policy-based judgment that admission of a coerced confession is "fundamentally different" 2 1 8 from other types of erroneously
admitted evidence, including other erroneously admitted confessions, says nothing about how the different confessions affect the
jury determinations. Nonetheless, the effect on the jury is the primary concern of the harmless error doctrine, since the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
21 9
to the defendant's conviction.
C.

HARMLESSNESS OF THE PRESENT ERROR

Assuming that the admission of Fulminante's confession to
Sarivola was erroneous, the majority correctly holds that it cannot
determine that the erroneous admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard announced in Chapman for evaluating the harmlessness of an error requires that the
prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 2 20 Considering all of the evidence that led to Fulminante's conviction, and
taking into. account the existence of a second, constitutionally acceptable confession, the decision as to the harmlessness of the erroneous admission of the first confession is a difficult one. However,
the close relationship between the first and second confessions
seems to support a finding that it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the first confession did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction.
The Chief Justice, in dissent, argues that the existence of the
second confession to Donna, which gave more details of the crime
218 Fulminante, IIl S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting in part).
219 Id. at 1257.
220 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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than the first confession, and which was properly admitted into evidence, easily renders the error of admitting Fulminante's first confession harmless. 22 ' The Chief Justice, however, offers no
discussion of the relationship of the unconstitutional confession to
the properly admitted evidence. Such an examination is necessary if
the court is to determine whether the error of improperly admitting
the confession contributed to the conviction. The fact that a proper
second confession was admitted into evidence may weigh heavily in
favor of a finding that the jury would have convicted the defendant
based on that confession alone, without consideration of the first
confession. However, this evidence cannot be taken at face value,
for circumstances may have been such that the court cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the second confession alone would
have caused the jury to convict.
The majority properly points to the close relationship between
Sarivola and his fiancee, Donna, to argue that absent the first confession, the jury might not have believed Donna's story recounting
the second confession. 2 22 One reason the story might have been
unbelievable was that neither Donna nor Sarivola notified the authorities of Donna's conversation with Fulminante until thirteen
months later.2 23 The Court also emphasizes that not all of the details of the confession to Donna were corroborated by circumstantial
evidence. 22 4 In addition, the jury might not have believed Donna if
it thought that she had an incentive to lie in order to further her
fiance's interests as a paid FBI informant. 2 25 Further, the prosecution conceded at closing argument that the physical evidence, without the confessions, was insufficient to convict. 226 Therefore, if the
jury might not have believed Donna's account of Fulminante's confession absent Sarivola's story, and if the physical evidence alone
was insufficient to warrant a finding of guilty, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the confession to
Sarivola did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction.
Justice White concedes that in some circumstances, two confesFulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1266 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.
Id. Although the majority claims that Donna's allegation that Fulminante told her
he chokedJeneane was not corroborated by circumstantial evidence, authorities did find
a ligature around Jeneane's neck. However, the physical evidence did not show that
Jeneane had been sexually assaulted, even though Fulminante allegedly told Donna that
he had. The fact that sexual assault might have been established if not for the decomposed nature of the body does not help the prosecution's case. That part of Donna's
story is still uncorroborated.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1258.
221
222
223
224
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sions could be completely independent of each other. 22 7 For example, the jury might find that the confessions did not reinforce each
other, in which case one confession could be said to be cumulative
of the other.2 28 Despite Justice White's disapproval of the use of
harmless error analysis in cases of coerced confessions, this statement seems to suggest that in some cases where one, proper confession was admitted into evidence, the improper admission of another
confession might be harmless, depending on the relative independence of the two confessions. However, the above discussion illustrates that the two confessions at issue in Fulminante simply were not
sufficiently independent of one another to warrant a finding that the
jury would have convicted based on only the second confession.2 29
The admission of the first confession was held not to have been
harmless in part because the second confession did not render it
cumulative, but also because it led to the admission of other evidence that was quite prejudicial to Fulminante. 2 30 Evidence of the
confession to Sarivola opened the door to admission of character
evidence with respect to Sarivola that reflected on Fulminante by
portraying him as someone who willingly kept company with
criminals. 23 ' Although it is impossible to say precisely what weight
the jury gave to the character evidence, or to what extent Fulminante was prejudiced in the jurors' minds because of it, it cannot be
said beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to his
conviction.
In conclusion, it should not be said that the admission of the
first confession, which was arguably given voluntarily and therefore
not even erroneously admitted, caused the jurors' reasoning to be
necessarily and critically flawed. Therefore the error of the admission should not be exempted from harmless error analysis. However, the question of whether an error may be analyzed in terms of
harmlessness is quite different from the question of whether the error was harmless. 23 2 The present error, although serious, did not so
Id. at 1259.
See id. The position of the Arizona Supreme Court in its initial opinion was that
the second confession to Donna rendered the first one to Sarivola cumulative and that
based on the overwhelming evidence provided by the second confession, admission of
the first confession was harmless. Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 245-46 (1988).
229 Fulminante, III S. Ct. at 1259.
230 Id.
227
228

231 Id. at 1260.

232 This is illustrated in part by the fact thatJustice Kennedy, while not elaborating on
his reasoning, stated in his concurring opinion that he believed not only that harmless
error analysis was appropriate in the present case, but that the analysis should have
shown that the error was not harmless. Id. at 1266-1267 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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poison the reasoning of the jury that based on a consideration of all
of the circumstances it could not be said under any circumstances to
have been harmless. Indeed, had the second confession not been
flawed in the ways discussed above, it would have been difficult to
argue that the jury's reasoning in convicting Fulminante was flawed.
However, based on a consideration of all of the interrelated evidence and circumstances of the present case, no court should be
able to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the first
confession did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction.
SARA

E.
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